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The 1993 Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a large cross-section of the Italian population covering 
24,000 individuals, reports detailed information on children’s attendance of public and private schools and 
parents’ assessments of the quality of public schools in the city of residence. The survey also provides detailed 
information on the household’s demographic structure, income and parents’ education. The empirical analysis 
indicates that the quality of schools is one of the driving factors in the choice between private and public schools. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The question between private versus public provision and financing of education is 
receiving increasing attention. In spite of this debate, very little is known about the factors that 
guide parents’ choice between private and public schools. Apart from the obvious role played by 
parents’ resources, it is still unclear if parents’ decisions are driven by quality considerations and 
quality comparisons between public and private schools. In the literature, school quality is often 
measured by the pupil-teacher ratio, class size, teachers’ salaries and experience. However, these 
indicators are almost invariably aggregated by geographical areas, and are not available for 
individual schools. This makes the task of estimating the actual impact of quality on choice of 
school difficult, because the quality index might be correlated with other geographical variables.  
In this paper we provide evidence on the effect of quality on school choice using data 
drawn from the 1993 Survey of Household Income and Wealth, which covers a large cross-
section representative of the Italian population. The survey contains information on school 
attendance (private or public) and a subjective assessment of the quality of public schools.
1 This 
information is then merged with provincial data on aggregate indicators of school quality (such as 
the pupil-teacher ratio). While the subjective quality score refers to many school characteristics – 
some of which unobservable – objective indicators measure school resources in each 
geographical area. Even though subjective measures may be more volatile and contaminated by 
measurement error, they refer to local public schools where the family expects to send its 
children; on the other hand, objective indicators do not vary across individuals in the same 
geographical region. By combining the two type of variables, we can therefore relate school 
choice not only to aggregate resources, but also to subjective indicators that vary at the individual 
level. 
Studying parents’ decisions to invest in the education of their children is not easy in 
countries in which private schools receive direct or indirect government support. In this respect, 
Italy represents an interesting case study. 
                                                 
1 The question is: “Based on your personal experience or on that of your family, can you give a mark ranging from 
10 (best outcome) and 0 (worst outcome) to [followed by a list of 17 items, including]… the working of local schools 
(primary and secondary).”   8
First of all, the private enrollment rate in elementary and secondary schools for the OECD 
countries is just 2.9 percent, reflecting the massive role of government in providing education.
2 In 
the United States, where the educational system is more market-oriented, the private enrollment 
rate is 10.9 percent. Italy’s 5.5 percent rate is not as high as in the United States, but is 
considerably above the OECD average. 
Second, given the constitutional mandate that privately managed schools cannot receive 
government support, parents who choose private schools must also pay tuition out-of-pocket.
3 
Accordingly, if they believe that private schools offer a better education than public schools, 
parents must pay for quality. 
Finally, Italy features a centralized school system, setting national standards for both public 
and private schools.
4 Centralization should result in considerable school homogeneity, at least at 
the compulsory level where national standards are more rigid. So in principle the system should 
exhibit minimal variation in observable quality indicators, such as student-teacher ratios or 
average classroom size. However, given the considerable geographical variation in population 
density and fertility rates and the different financial involvement of local governments in the 
provision of buildings and facilities, in practice there is ample heterogeneity of schools, resulting 
in different quality indicators among regions, among provinces within the same region, and even 
within provinces. As we shall see, it is this variability that allows us to identify the effect of 
school quality on school choice. 
Throughout the paper, we focus on elementary and secondary schools. We do not consider 
the enrollment decision at the pre-school level, because this depends chiefly on the labor market 
status of mothers, while labor market participation itself also depends on the availability of pre-
                                                 
2 The OECD defines as private schools "privately managed institutions that receive less than 50 percent of funding 
from public sources." Data refer to 1999. Source: OECD (2002), Table C1.4. 
3 Since public schools are financed out of general tax revenues regardless of attendance, in practice childless parents 
subsidize parents with children, and parents with children in private schools pay for both public and private 
education. 
4 Italian laws specify not only the length of compulsory education (age 6 to 14 until 1999, then raised to 16), but also 
the types of private and public schools that can operate, the maximum number of students in each class and the 
minimum number of teachers per class. For each type of school, the law provides guidelines on the subjects that must 
be taught, course outlines, evaluation and grading methods, vacation periods and even school entry and exit times. 
This reduces the dimensions along which private and public schools can differ, and also the differences among 
private schools themselves.   9
schools, creating two-way causation and endogeneity (Del Boca, 2002). For quite different 
reasons, we do not analyze the choice between private and public universities. The higher 
education system in Italy is mostly public, and there are very few students in private institutions. 
Since public universities are not always available in the province of residence, and private 
universities exist only in Rome and Milano, the choice of attending a private university entails 
other cost differences that affect students' choice besides tuition. In addition, the choice of a 
university is usually not the parent's but the student's choice, within the limits of the budget 
allocated by parents. For both reasons we have decided not to analyze this choice. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the economics of school choice. 
Section 3 describes the most common indicators of school quality and Section 4 the variables that 
will be used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 describes the sample and Section 6 presents 
probit estimates for the choice between private and public schools. Section 7 concludes, drawing 
policy implications, particularly on the importance of information about school quality and on the 
role of the government in affecting school choice. 
 
 
2. The economics of school choice 
 
The starting point of the economic literature on school choice is that private schools widen 
households’ opportunity sets. The standard assumption of human capital investment models is 
that private (and more expensive) schools are of higher quality than public schools (Stiglitz, 
1974; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992). Private schools allow parents to choose the amount and the 
quality of education that they believe appropriate, given their degree of altruism and the expected 
talent of their offspring. Parents who wish to invest in the human capital of their children beyond 
the level provided by the public school system can opt out and choose a private school. In 
principle, with perfect capital markets parents’ choice is unconstrained. But given limited 
borrowing capacity, parents are constrained. They cannot choose private schools if their current 
resources are below some threshold level. 
There are also other reasons for choosing private schools. Some parents elect to send their 
children to private schools because they explicitly support certain values, such as religion   10
(Sander, 2001)
5; others because private schools have better sport facilities, or lower 
transportation costs. Sometimes the quality of education or facilities is not even the main issue. 
Some people consider private education a status symbol (Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss, 1996), a 
way of improving their own and their children’s social networks, of shielding their children from 
social problems, avoiding contact with immigrants and children with handicaps, or simply 
because they do not approve of the open and more heterogeneous public school environment 
(Gradstein and Justman, 2001). 
Empirically, it is hard to determine which factors drive parents’ choices. Some of the 
variables that might affect parents’ choice are not observable (for instance, parents’ perception of 
children’s abilities and how they will perform in the labor market) or difficult to measure (for 
instance, intensity of religious belief). Others are easier to measure, at least in principle. In 
particular, the quality of education should be the main factor if parents consider private education 
as an investment good. If instead parents base their decisions on other characteristics, quality 
should not be a major concern.
6 
Most of the available empirical evidence refers to the United States. In a sample of white 
parents, Lankford and Lee (1995) find that the decision to enroll in private elementary and 
secondary schools depends on household income and parents’ education, the racial composition 
of public schools, the juvenile crime rate in the area of residence, and inner city location. Proxies 
for schools’ expenditure per student and tuition fees do not seem to affect parents’ choice. 
Buddin, Cordes and Kirby (1998) study secondary school choice in a 1990 sample of California 
residents and find that parents’ age, race, education and income affect the probability of choosing 
a private school. Working mothers are more likely to select private schools, signaling the 
interaction with the choice of labor market participation. The coefficients of the indicators of 
tuition fees and of the quality of private and public schools (proxied by expenditure per students 
                                                 
5 By comparing a sample of voucher users in New York city with the eligible population, Howell (2004) finds that 
religious identity and practice is by and far the most significant variable affecting the permanence in the program. 
6 Teske and Schneider (2001) survey several studies relative to the US experience reporting that greater parental 
choice induces more satisfaction and parental involvement. A common problem of these studies is that it is difficult 
to assess whether actual parents’ behavior is consistent with their declarations: “…most of the studies are based on 
surveys of what parents say they want from the schools and very few are based on the actual choice behavior of 
parents” (p.613).   11
and teachers’ salaries) are not statistically different from zero.
7 On the other hand, Figlio and 
Stone (2001), merging individual-level data with resource indicators at the school level, find that 
local violent crime rates, school district concentration, and student-teacher ratios in public 
schools affect school composition, especially in retaining those students most likely to opt out of 
public schools. Overall, this literature does not provide clear-cut evidence that educational quality 
affects private school attendance, at least for US secondary schools.  
Studies of the effectiveness of private education provide indirect evidence on the 
economics of school choice. Some papers suggest that there are potential benefits of attending 
private schools, but that these benefits are likely to be small, at least in the U.S.
8 In particular, 
students who attended a Catholic school have slightly better labor market outcomes and 
performance in further education than students who attended public schools. Outcomes and 
performance of private school students also tend to be weakly related to students’ background. 
Other studies obtain different results. Sander (2001) finds that US Catholic schools enhance 
the ability of parents in promoting Catholic values and beliefs but have no effect on educational 
outcomes except for minorities. Using a sample of university students from a large metropolitan 
area in Italy, Bertola and Checchi (2002) find that the academic performance of students who 
attended a private secondary school is actually worse than that of those who went to public 
school. They explain that this result reflects differences in the composition of the student body. 
That is, private schools are attended disproportionately by less capable students from richer 
families. Finally, some studies claim that quality indicators do not affect educational outcomes 
because resources are used inefficiently, see Hanushek (2002) for a survey. 
Our reading of this literature is that there is no compelling empirical evidence for the 
hypothesis that parents choose private schools because they provide higher quality education. The 
low price elasticity of the demand for private education indicates that the perceived opportunity 
costs of ignoring quality are also relatively low. And the lack of evidence of substantial benefits 
                                                 
7 Since specific information on school attendance is not available, Buddin, Cordes and Kirby (1998) proxy the 
quality of public and private schools by the corresponding aggregate indicators in the area of residence (SMSA). 
Long and Toma (1988) obtain similar results. 
8 See, among others, Evans and Schwab (1995), Neal (1997), and Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2000).   12
from attending private schools weakens the hypothesis that parents should invest in private 
education from a purely monetary point of view. 
These studies, however, are mostly based on highly aggregate data (e.g., at the state or 
SMSA level), where the variables of interest are likely to be correlated with other unobserved 
determinants of school choice, such as family background, preferences and social networks. In 
the present paper we study the impact of quality on school choice relying on a very large sample 
of Italian households. The survey contains an assessment of school quality that varies at the 
individual level. We also supplement the survey data with objective measures of the resources 
available to public and to private schools, collected at the province level from administrative 
sources and from independent evidence available in recent survey of school parental choice.  
 
 
3. School quality 
 
Several different measures of school quality are possible: outcome indicators, resource 
indicators, and subjective assessments. Each raises a set of econometric problems. Estimates 
based on outcome indicators are contaminated by the different characteristics of public and 
private school students, and must be corrected for selection bias. Aggregate resource indicators 
do not allow one to distinguish geographical effects from genuine quality differences. In cross-
sectional studies, each of the indicators might be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity at the 
individual level. 
Microeconomic surveys with outcome indicators based on student performance, such as 
standardized tests or labor market performance are not available in Italy.
9 Administrative sources 
provide detailed structure or resource indicators for 92 provinces (comparable to US counties): 
average class or school size, student-teacher ratio, proportion of repeating students and 
                                                 
9 Until 2001, the national final exam at the end of upper secondary school was the only national test graded by a 
commission external to the school (replaced in 2002 by an internal commission). The test consists of open questions 
(which are not as easily compared across students as in the case of multiple choice tests), however, and grading is not 
uniform across commissions. Since students in private and public schools have different characteristics and 
backgrounds, evaluation of student performance in college or in the labor market should be supplemented by 
microeconomic data on students as well as commission members.   13
proportion of students in double or triple shifts due to school congestion. The student-teacher 
ratio is the only indicator available at the provincial level for both public and private schools. 
Provincial differences are substantial. The ratio in compulsory public schools (elementary and 
lower secondary) ranges from 6.9 in the province of Imperia (North-West of Italy) to 13.4 in the 
Sicilian province of Ragusa.
10 Still in compulsory schools, the proportion of students in double or 
triple shifts due to school congestion is virtually nil in Northern and Central Italy, but as high as 6 
percent in Naples and 14 percent in Caltanissetta (again in Sicily).
11 There is considerable 
variability in the student-teacher ratio even in upper secondary schools, with a range from 7.7 to 
10.2. But this indicator is harder to interpret, because aggregate statistics do not distinguish 
between different types of schools (academic, technical, and vocational, all giving access to 
university), and might reflect compositional effects across provinces. 
A third way to estimate the quality of schools is to rely on parents’ assessment. Subjective 
quality indicators based on survey questions vary across individuals, allowing easier 
identification of the impact of quality on school choice even controlling for fixed effects. 
Furthermore, individual choice is based on perceived quality, which does not necessarily 
correspond to objectively measured quality. On the other hand, survey measures could be 
contaminated by individual characteristics and correlated with individual preferences for public 
schools and might suffer from cognitive dissonance, the ex post rationalization that confirms the 
choice. To take into account this potential criticism, in the empirical estimates we examine the 
reliability of subjective quality scores examining its association with aggregate school variables – 
e.g., student teacher ratio – and its relation to individual attributes. 
 
 
4. The quality score in the Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
 
                                                 
10 While in the U.S. the typical student-teacher ratio ranges from 15 to 20, in Italian primary and secondary schools it 
ranges from 8 to 12, given that classes seldom exceed 25 students with 2 or 3 teachers. 
11 Data refer to 1993, the year of our microeconomic survey. More recent data exhibit similar patterns.   14
The 1993 SHIW provides a unique opportunity to test the effect of school quality on the 
choice between public and private education. Conducted biannually by the Bank of Italy, that 
year the survey collected data on a representative sample of 8,089 households (24,013 
individuals). Respondents provide information on parent’s income, educational achievement and 
other demographic variables. 
The survey contains a section on the perceived quality of public services (schools, health, 
transportation) and the use of alternative private services. In particular, survey respondents (the 
household head or the person responsible for the financial matters of the household) are asked to 
rate the quality of public schools in their area of residence (unfortunately, a similar question for 
private schools is not asked). We select all households with at least one school-age child (4,648 
households) and then match individual information on school attendance, parents' education, and 
labor market status of head and spouse, with the household’s quality score and disposable 
income.
12 
Descriptive and regression analysis reveals that the quality score is a reliable and 
informative indicator of parents' attitudes towards education, as witnessed by the correlation of 
the quality score with aggregate indicators and regressions of quality on individual 
characteristics. To examine the relation between aggregate indicators and the quality score, we 
aggregate the score by region and plot it in Figure 1. There is substantial regional variation. On 
average, quality is considerably lower in the South (a minimum in Campania) and peaks in two 
Northern regions, Trentino and Emilia. In Figure 2 we plot the regional student-teacher ratio for 
elementary, lower secondary and upper secondary public schools. The figure confirms that also 
according to aggregate indicators public schools in the South are lower in quality. Figure 3 plots 
the aggregate student-teacher ratio against the quality rating. The relation is negative and 
statistically different from zero, for both elementary and upper secondary schools, suggesting that 
subjective evaluations tend to conform to objective data. Similar correlations between quality 
score and various measures of school resources are reported in Table 1. The quality rating is 
strongly correlated with all aggregate indicators, but especially with those for elementary schools: 
availability of teachers (the student-teacher ratio), facilities, proportion of students in extended 
                                                 
12 Relating school choice to the quality score thus requires the assumption that the quality score of the head is the 
same as that of the spouse.   15
shifts and proportion of full-day students whose schedule extends beyond lunchtime (the standard 
schedule calls for six mornings a week).
13 Many of the indicators are strongly collinear and 
cannot be used simultaneously in regression analysis. For this reason in the empirical analysis we 
focus on the student-teacher ratio as a summary measure of school resources available to 
students. 
As a further check on the reliability of the quality score, we regress it on a full set of 
dummies for region, sex, age, education, marital status, and number of children. The results are 
not reported for brevity, but only the regional dummies have coefficients statistically different 
from zero. The most natural interpretation of this experiment is that the quality score reflects 
genuine variations in quality and not respondents’ preferences for or bias against public schools. 
Quality scores vary substantially even within regions or provinces. Figure 4 reports, by 
region, the proportion of respondents whose rating is poor (3 or less) or excellent (above 7). Even 
in top quality regions, such as Trentino, where 20 percent give excellent scores, about 5 percent 
of the sample assigns very poor scores. On the other hand, even in Campania, the lowest quality 
region, where almost a third give very low scores, some people rate locally available public 
schools as excellent. Since the question asked refers to public schools in the respondent's 
neighborhood, the most natural explanation for the variability of the indicator within regions (or 
provinces) is that it reflects substantial inequality between different local schools. As we shall 
see, it is this intra-province variability that allows us to identify the quality effect. 
The 1993 SHIW also contains an estimate of tuition costs for elementary and secondary 
school combined. At the time, Italian private schools received no public funding, so all students 
had to pay tuition.
14 In 1993 private tuition (including meals, but not transportation and 
textbooks), came to 2.25 million lire per year, equivalent to about Euro 1,500 at 2002 prices.
15 
                                                 
13 Parents with higher education might have more informed opinions. However, the correlation coefficients reported 
in Table 1 are not affected when we split the sample by parents’ educational attainment. 
14 In 2001 the local governments of Lombardy, Emilia, Veneto and Puglia started to issue income-related vouchers to 
cover public or private school costs. 
15 The comparable cost of public schools was Euro 190.   16
However this information is lacking for more than a third of the sample attending private schools, 
so we do not use provincial averages to proxy for the cost gap.
16 
 
5. The sample 
  
We select three groups of children by type of institutions attended: elementary school (1218 
children aged 6 to 10), lower secondary school (804 children aged 11 to 13) and upper secondary 
school (1667 aged 14 to 18). We then match each child with information on his or her household, 
including disposable income, parents’ education, province of residence, and city size. Our 
analysis, that is to say, is conducted at the child rather than parent level. 
The survey tends to underestimate private school attendance by about 2 percentage points, 
but the ranking of private enrolment rates corresponds to the national aggregates: 5.1 percent in 
elementary schools, 2.2 percent in lower secondary and 5.4 in upper secondary.
17 A likely reason 
for the under-estimation of private school attendance is that this is strongly correlated with 
income, while the survey is meant to be representative of the population at large and does not 
fully reflect the behavior of high-income groups. 
Given the great geographical variability in the quality of public schools, it is perhaps not 
surprising to find ample intra-regional differences also in private school attendance. However, 
these differences do not necessarily mirror the quality indicators. In fact, private enrollment rates 
in compulsory schools are 4.5 percent in the North, 5.2 percent in the Center and 2.7 percent in 
the South, while the average index of quality score is 7 in the North, 6.7 in the Center and 5.7 in 
the South. Of course one would not expect the simple correlation between the quality score and 
the private enrollment rate to be positive; the income factor is important, and incomes are much 
lower in the South. 
                                                 
16 Also lacking is information on the type of private school attended (confessional or lay private schools). 
Independent evidence shows that more than 50 percent of private schools are managed by organizations affiliated to 
the Catholic Church, especially secondary academic and vocational schools. 
17 These numbers should be compared with the 1993 aggregate statistics: 7.6 percent in primary schools, 4.4 percent 
in lower secondary and 8.7 in upper secondary. Source: ISTAT (1995), Statistiche della scuola materna ed 
elementare - anno scolastico 1992-93; ISTAT (1995), Statistiche della scuola media inferiore - anno scolastico 
1992-93; ISTAT (1994), Statistiche delle scuole secondarie superiori - anno scolastico 1992-93.   17
In Table 2 we report sample means for selected variables for children in elementary, lower 
secondary, and upper secondary schools, distinguishing between public and private. The table 
confirms that the proportion attending private schools correlates negatively with parents’ 
perception of quality, and positively with income. The probability of choosing a private school 
increases with the educational attainment of both parents: the proportion of university-educated 
fathers and mothers choosing private schools is 57 and 65 percent, respectively. Single parents, 
large households and residents in the South also tend to choose public schools. Two thirds of 
private enrollment is in medium-sized or large cities. Disposable income has a major impact on 
private enrollment rates: more than half of the students in private schools at all levels 
(elementary, lower secondary, or upper secondary) come from households in the top quartile of 
the income distribution and only about 10 percent from the bottom two quartiles. 
On average, parents who send their children to private schools do not rate the public school 
system as lower in quality than do parents with children in public schools (6.25 against 6.33 in 
elementary schools, 6.52 against 6.41 in lower secondary and 7.08 against 6.38 in upper 
secondary). But comparison of sample means does not take account of quality’s correlation with 
income and other geographical characteristics. For this we must turn to regression analysis. 
 
 
6. Regression results 
 
Table 3 relates the probability of private school attendance (elementary and lower 
secondary school combined) to various potential determinants of school choice. Our basic 
specification includes child’s sex, dummies for parents’ education, for single parents, number of 
siblings, income quartiles and two indicators of the quality of public schools (the parents’ rating 
and the provincial student-teacher ratio).
18  
The results confirm that household disposable income and the quality of public schools are 
strong determinants of enrollment in private schools. The probability that a child with parents in 
                                                 
18 Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. We also check for the presence of cluster effects coming from the 
fact that some children belong to the same households. The results are qualitatively similar, and are available on   18
the fourth income quartile will attend private school is between 7 and 10 percentage points higher 
than that of a child with parents in the first quartile. Both subjective and objective quality 
indicators affect the schooling decision.  The coefficient of the quality score is negative and 
statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of the student-teacher ratio 
is positive and statistically significant. Considering the estimates of the first column, an increase 
of one standard deviation of the quality score lowers private enrollment by 6.2 percent, whereas a 
standard deviation increase in the number of students per teacher raises it by 9 percent.
19 Overall, 
private enrollment rates are higher where the aggregate student-teacher ratio in public schools is 
relatively high and their quality score relatively low.
20  
In principle, also the quality of private schools should affect the enrolment decision. We 
therefore add to the basic probit specification the student-teacher ratio in private schools in each 
province, our only available quality indicator. The coefficient of this indicator is small in absolute 
value and not statistically different from zero, and the variable has accordingly been dropped 
from the basic specification. 
The estimates uncover other interesting results. The negative coefficient of “Number of 
siblings” could be taken as evidence that liquidity considerations affect parental choice. 
However, the coefficient could be biased, because fertility choice might depend on unobservable 
characteristics.  Contrary to other results in the literature (Lankford and Lee, 1995; Buddin, 
Cordes and Kirby, 1998), we find that parents’ educational attainment does not affects the choice 
of private schools.
21 
                                                                                                                                                              
request. Results using a continuous income variable are similar; we prefer using income quartiles dummies to model 
the non-linear relation between household resources and school choice. 
19 For primary schools we can supplement the evidence in Table 3 using two other indicators of school quality: the 
fraction of students under daily shifts for lack of space (using the specification in column 1 of Table 3 the coefficient 
is 0.67), and the fraction of students in unfit buildings (a coefficient 0.42 and a standard error of 0.16); both are 
statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. The effect of the two structure indicators of school quality are 
in line with our interpretation that a worsening of public school standards raises the probability of private enrolment. 
Unfortunately the indicators are non available for secondary schools. 
20 Using aggregate provincial data we regress the private enrollment rate on the student-teacher ratio, regional 
dummies and average income in the province. The coefficient of the student-teacher ratio is 0.01 (with a t-statistic of 
1.64), showing that aggregate indicators alone do not explain educational choices. 
21 Given the correlation between father’s and mothers’ education, the lack of significance of the two coefficients 
might reflect multicollinearity. We therefore replace the two variables with the average education of the spouses. In 
this case the parents’ education coefficient in the specification of  Table 3 is positive and statistically different from 
zero.   19
The second probit of Table 3 adds parents’ age, dummies for city size, for households 
where at least one adult member does not work (“housewife”) and for residence in the Center and 
in the South (the North is the reference dummy). We find that older parents are less likely to send 
children to private schools, while living in large cities or in the North increases private school 
attendance. Living in a city increases the probability of private enrollment by 8 percentage points. 
This reflects not only the greater availability of private schools, but also the higher juvenile crime 
rate, which presumably induces some parents to shield their children from exposure to social 
problems. 
The possible interaction between women’s labor force participation and school choice is of 
great interest not only for the economics of school choice but also for household’s allocation of 
time and employment opportunities. Since many private schools have extended schedules of 
activities, the presence of a housewife should lower the probability of choosing private school; 
and the coefficient of this variable is indeed negative and statistically different from zero at the 
10 percent level, lending support to the hypothesis that some parents choose private education as 
a substitute for child care, not for better education.
22 However, we hesitate to attribute causal 
significance, given that labor market participation itself may depend on the availability of private 
schools  (Del Boca, 2002). 
The results of the first two probits are open to the objection that the effect of quality on 
school choice could be spurious. The many possible omitted significant factors include religion, 
political orientation, local labor market conditions, and crime rates. We attempt to control for all 
these factors by introducing a full set of provincial dummies in the third column of Table 3. This 
entails dropping the provincial student-teacher ratio. The results are qualitatively unchanged. The 
probability of attending private school decreases with the quality score for public schools: an 
increase in the quality score of one standard deviation lowers the private enrollment rate by 6.1 
percent. Although the inclusion of provincial fixed effects is the best way forward with the 
available data, it represents only a partial solution to the problem of omitted variables, since 
possible omitted factors might vary substantially within provinces. For instance, more religious 
                                                 
22 We also include hours worked by parents. The coefficient of this variable is not statistically different from zero.   20
parents may be more likely to choose private schools and to assess public school quality more 
critically simply because they prefer a religious education. 
A related point is the potential endogeneity of the quality score indicator due to the fact that 
parents who have chosen private schools might tend to give a lower rate to public schools.
23 
Consider again the case of religious beliefs, an unobservable variable we cannot control for. If 
churchgoers have a negative attitude towards state entities, they will systematically provide a 
lower score for public schools and, at the same time but for independent reasons, may prefer 
private (religious) schools, and the estimated coefficient of the quality score will be biased.
24 
A weak exogeneity test of the quality score variable can be constructed in two steps. In the 
first step we regress the quality indicator on the instruments and the exogenous variables. In the 
second step we use the residuals from the first stage regression as an additional explanatory 
variable in the school choice equation. Smith and Blundell (1986) show that the weak exogeneity 
test is asymptotically equivalent to testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the residuals 
of the first stage regression in the school choice equation is not statistically different from zero. 
We use as instruments father’s and mother’s education interacted with dummies for city size. The 
weak exogeneity test does not reject the hypothesis that the quality score is weakly exogenous at 
the 5 percent significance level for each of the equations in Table 3 (the test is reported in the last 
line of the table). 
To illustrate the results further, Figure 5 plots the predicted probability of attending private 
school for selected values of the regressors: a child living in a large Northern city from an 
average household (in terms of parental age, parental education and number of siblings) in the top 
income quartile. The figure shows that a one-point increase in the quality score reduces the 
probability by about half a percentage point. Since the enrollment rate in this selected sample is 
8.7 percent, lowering the quality score from 8 to 2 doubles the probability of private enrollment.  
Table 4 reports separate probit estimates for elementary and lower secondary schools. For 
each sample, we report the basic specification, the specification with regional, city size and 
                                                 
23 Causality between school quality and school choice could go the other direction. If peer group effects are 
important and there is cream skimming, then in areas in which more people go to private schools,  public schools 
will be worse. However, in the Italian case, existing evidence points to a different self-selection in (upper secondary) 
private schools, which gather less brilliant children from richer families (Bertola and Checchi 2002). 
24 Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity, the test statistic is distributed as a chi-squared with 1 degree of freedoms.   21
“housewife” dummies and the specification with provincial dummies. Although the sample for 
these regressions is considerably smaller, the general pattern is similar to that of Table 3. The 
enrollment rate is strongly correlated with parents’ income and city size. The coefficient of the 
quality score is negative and of the same order of magnitude in all specifications, although in the 
sample of children attending lower secondary schools it is less precisely estimated than in the 
other regressions. The coefficient of “housewife” is negative, as in Table 3, but not statistically 
different from zero except in the specification with provincial dummies for lower secondary 
schools. 
These probits do not capture potentially important motivations for three groups of parents: 
those who wish to enroll their children in elementary schools earlier than the standard age, those 
with children with handicaps or serious diseases and those who are strongly Roman Catholic.  
While public schools can enroll only children at least 5 years and 6 months old in 
September of each year, private schools are more flexible, and also take younger children. So one 
motivation for choosing private schools is to anticipate the legal school age. The survey includes 
225 five-year olds, 52.8 percent of whom attend first grade, resulting in a sample of 1,332 
children in elementary school. As a robustness check, we therefore estimate the probit on this 
extended sample. The results are unchanged and, for brevity, they are not reported. 
Children with officially certified handicaps receive special attention in public schools and 
are entitled to an individual, full-time teacher. Since private schools have no such program, 
parents of children with handicaps really have no choice. We cannot test formally for this effect 
because the 1993 SHIW does not report information on health. Some information is available in 
the 1995 survey, where 5 percent of children are reported with handicap, chronic disease or very 
poor health. Using the panel section of the 1993-95 surveys, we merge the 1995 data on health 
status with the 1993 information on school choice and find that out of 50 children with health 
problems only 1 attended private school. 
The 1993 survey does not measure the intensity of religious belief or provide information 
data on the type of private school attended. To check whether Catholic parents are more likely to 
select Catholic schools, we rely on regional indicators of the intensity of religious belief available 
in a 1996 Survey: the proportion of individuals going to church every day, several times a week,   22
once a week, or several times a month.
25 We add this variable to the set of regressors and 
estimate the probit for school choice omitting provincial dummies. We find that the coefficient of 
the proxy for Catholic beliefs is positive but not statistically different from zero, while the 
coefficients of the other variables are unaffected. 
In Table 5 we extend the analysis to upper secondary schools. With respect to compulsory 
school, there are some noteworthy differences. Girls are more likely to attend private school, 
possibly reflecting differential parental protectiveness. Private enrollment is correlated with 
income, but the coefficients are imprecisely estimated. At this higher, non-compulsory school 
level, father’s education has a positive impact on private school attendance. The coefficient of the 
quality score is not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, the provincial student-
teacher ratio has a much greater impact than in compulsory schools (of course, the ratio is 
dropped when we introduce fixed provincial effects). 
The result that school quality matters is also corroborated by independent evidence 
available in a different survey of Italian households (multiple answers are possible). Table 6 
shows that 38.9 percent of parents who choose to register their children in private schools do so 
for the “quality of teaching” and 40.8 percent for the “service offered.” Only 13.7 percent report 
as “cultural or ideological reasons” (in agreement with the lack of significance of the intensity of 
religious belief in the school choice equation), and less than 25 percent for location (“school 
available nearby” or “vicinity”). These numbers suggest that school quality considerations are a 
chief concern of parents choosing private schools, reinforcing the econometric evidence.  
 
 
                                                 
25 The Multiscopo survey was carried out by ISTAT, the National Statistical Institute. Italy’s 20 regions are divided 
into 95 provinces. So regional indicators are collinear with provincial dummies. The proxy for Catholic beliefs 
attains the lowest values in the central and highest in the northern regions. In Liguria, Emilia, and Tuscany only 40 
percent of the sample goes to church at least a few times a month; in Trentino and Veneto, about 65 percent do.    23
7. Policy implications 
 
Under the Constitution privately managed schools cannot receive State financial support: 
accordingly, the Italian school system is a clear case in which parents who choose private schools 
must also pay tuition out-of-pocket. The regression analysis conducted here suggests that the 
quality of public schools (as perceived by parents or as measured by provincial indicators of 
school resources) is an important determinant of the choice between private and public schools, 
even controlling for provincial fixed effects. We also find that private school attendance at the 
compulsory level is strongly correlated with parents’ income, while larger family size and, in 
elementary and lower secondary schools, the presence of a housewife reduce the probability of 
private enrollment. The results are robust with respect to the presence of provincial effects and 
the potential endogeneity of the subjective quality score indicator.  
The effect of quality on school choice has some interesting policy implications. First of all, 
since parents make decisions on the basis of their perception of school quality, it would be 
important to improve parents’ information about school characteristics and students’ performance 
in later schooling and in the labor market. In this respect, standardized national tests would be 
extremely valuable. It is unfortunate that Italy’s only national test – for the academic secondary 
school diploma – is not standardized. Evaluation is by commissions made up mostly of 
examiners internal to the student’s own school. Information on teachers’ competence, experience 
and background and on school facilities and resources would also help parents in making their 
choice. Given the ample variability in school quality even within relatively small districts, this 
information should be available and comparable for all the schools in every district. 
The second implication is that the amount of funding of public schools has a great impact 
on the private enrollment rate because changes in the level of spending for education affects 
public school quality. Cuts in public expenditures on education tend to reduce the quality of 
public schools, thereby heightening the demand for private education. Current proposals aim to 
reduce the number of public school teachers by about 40,000, raising the student-teacher ratio in 
compulsory schools by almost one point. According to our estimate of the coefficient of the   24
student-teacher ratio (the second regression of Table 3), this implies an increase of 10 percent in 
private enrollments. 
The positive correlation with working mothers indicates that private schools are also 
chosen for other features, regardless of educational quality. Singling out different reasons for 
investing in education is important. If private schools improve educational achievement and labor 
market performance, there could be a rationale for subsidizing private institutions through tax 
exemption or educational vouchers. However, if private education serves mainly as a substitute 
for other services (such as child care) or is chosen to develop social networks, ideology and 
religion, the externality argument provides no support for public intervention. At the moment the 
data do not allow us to discriminate fully between these hypothesis; we consider the issue 
important for future research. 
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Table 1 
Correlation matrix among quality indicators of public schools  
 
The correlation matrix is estimated on the basis of aggregate indicators of school quality and 92 provincial averages 




               1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1. Quality score 
  1.000   
        
       2. Student/teacher ratio in 
elementary schools  -0.4694* 
0.0000  1.0000 
      
      3. Student/teacher ratio in 
lower secondary schools  -0.1069 
0.3105 
0.6819* 
0.0000  1.0000 
     
     4. Student/teacher ratio in 





0.0000  1.0000 
    
    5. Proportion of elementary 









0.1877  1.0000 
   
   6. Proportion of elementary 
school students in buildings 










0.0001  1.0000 
  
7. Proportion of elementary 













0.0008  1.0000  
8. Proportion of upper 
secondary school students in 














0.0610  1.0000 
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Table 2  
Sample statistics 
 
Except for number of children, father’s and mother’s age, quality score and student-teacher ratio, values are 
expressed in percent (standard errors in parenthesis). Sample means are computed using population weights. The 
total number of observations does not equal the total sample size because there are children not attending the school 
level corresponding to their age (5 in the age group 6-10, 2 in the age group 11-13, and 227 in the age group 15-18, 
beyond compulsory school level). 
 
 
Variable  Elementary  Lower Secondary  Upper Secondary 
 
  Private  Public Private Public Private Public 
Female  39.7  47.5 38.9 44.4 58.9 47.7 
Father's education (lower secondary 
diploma or better)  57.9  41.2 48.4 39.4 64.5 38.4 
Mother's education (lower secondary 
diploma or better)   65.1  39.9 54.5 31.2 54.1 29.5 
























Single parent  3.0  6.5  2.4  10.5  4.9  10.1 












Housewife (at least one person at home)  36.1  50.1  43.2  50.4  39.8  49.4 
I income quartile  7.26  18.69  6.31  21.76  2.24  16.66 
II income quartile  5.36  33.27  9.46  30.01  28.73  25.55 
III income quartile  34.54  24.90  32.28  23.57  21.41  27.93 
IV income quartile  52.85  23.14  51.94  24.66  47.62  29.86 
























Resident in the North  39.8  37.9  61.3  37.0  44.5  35.3 
Resident in the Center  25.6  18.0  19.0  16.6  28.2  20.9 
Resident in the South  34.6  44.1  19.7  46.4  27.3  43.8 
City size<20,000  18.3  49.5  5.3  51.0  43.6  43.9 
20,000<City  size<40,000  9.8 14.4 18.4 13.7  8.5  15.5 
40,000<City  size<500,000  41.0  25.6 40.9 26.6 15.4 25.7 
City size>500,000  30.8  10.5  35.4  8.8  32.5  14.9 
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Table 3 
Probit regressions for private enrollment: compulsory education 
 
The table reports probit regressions for private enrollment in elementary and lower secondary school. Father’s and 
mother’s education are defined as lower secondary diploma or better. For each regression we report the marginal 
effect and the t-statistic of the original probit coefficient in parentheses. 
 



































































































Province dummies  NO NO  YES 
Pseudo R²  0.103  0.142  0.224 
Number of observations  1948  1948  1948 
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Table 4 
Probit regressions for private enrollment: elementary and lower secondary 
 
The table reports probit regressions for enrollment in private elementary and lower secondary school. Father’s and 
mother’s education are defined as lower secondary diploma or better. For each regression we report the marginal 
effect and the t-statistic of the original probit coefficient in parentheses. 
 
 
























































































































































































NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Pseudo R square 
 
0.108 0.161 0.279 0.102 0.152 0.216 
Number of observations  1172  1172  1172  776  776  776 
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Table 5 
Probit regressions for private enrollment: upper secondary 
 
 
The table reports probit regressions for private enrollment in upper secondary school. Father’s and mother’s 
education are defined as lower secondary diploma or better. For each regression we report the marginal effect and the 



































































































NO NO YES 
Pseudo R square 
 
0.113 0.132 0.196 
Number of observations  1351  1351  1351   32
Table 6 
Parents of students less than 18 years old registered in private schools 
per type of school and reason of parents’ choice – Italy 1998 
 
The table reports the answer to reasons for choosing private schools in a sample of 20,153 households interviewed in 
June 1998. Source: ISTAT, 2000, Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie. Famiglia, soggetti sociali e condizione 
dell’infanzia. 
 
  Primary  Lower secondary  Upper secondary 
 
Total 
No specific reason   11.3  11.6  6.1  9.8 
Only school available nearby   7.6  4.8  27.4  12.7 
Vicinity   14.8  12.8  11.7  13.5 
Services offered   48.9  41.5  26.1  40.8 
Cultural (ideological) reasons   14.0  13.4  13.5  13.7 
Quality of teaching   36.8  43.4  39.4  38.9 
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Figure 1. Quality score of public schools, by regions
 
 





















Figure 2. Student-teacher ratio, by regions
Primary Lower secondary
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Figure 3. The subjective quality score
and the student-teacher ratio
 
 



















Figure 4. Proportion finding very low or very high quality
of public schools, by region
Proportion high quality Proportion low quality
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Figure 5. The effect of the quality score
on the probability of private enrollment
 
 
 
 